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ABSTRACT
In order for a hopeful applicant to be granted a patent over
his invention, his application must satisfy several procedural and
substantive requirements. Among the substantive hurdles that an
applicant must clear is the mandate that patents only be issued
to applications claiming statutory subject matter within the
meaning of § 101 of the Patent Act. However, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has not
construed that Section consistently over the years. Since that
court’s formation in 1982, it has espoused two tests for statutory
subject matter, and each time has substantially abrogated, if not
overruled, the prior formulation. Most recently, the Federal
Circuit has handed down the “machine-or-transformation” test
in an attempt to redraft the limits of patent eligibility based on
subject matter. This iBrief will explore the significant changes
that this new test has brought to the patentability doctrine.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution expressly
vests Congress with the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right
to their . . . Discoveries.” 2 That clause, however, is not an unqualified
grant of power; and there are certain limitations on Congress’s ability to
grant such exclusive rights. 3 Congress began exercising its authority
under the Intellectual Property Clause in 1790 by passing the original
Patent Act. 4 The Act has undergone several revisions, the most recent of
which was in 1952. 5 In an attempt not to exceed its constitutionally
granted authority and to give effect to various policy concerns, Congress
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has incorporated several restrictions on which inventions may be
protected. 6 Among those restrictions is a threshold limitation on the
categories of subject matter eligible for patent protection. 7 That
restriction, set forth in Section 101 of the Act, is the focus of this iBrief.
Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”8 While
that language places certain limitations on statutory subject matter,
Congress clearly intended those limitations to be minimal. 9
¶2

¶3
Under Section 101, an invention will be deemed statutory subject
matter if it meets the requirements for any one of four categories—
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. 10 The
Supreme Court has recognized several other categories of subject matter,
however, that are not patent-eligible. Those categories have been referred
to collectively as “fundamental principles,” 11 and include: “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”12 No matter how recent
or useful the discovery of any such principle, that discovery cannot be
patented. 13 Giving somewhat more practical meaning to those categorical
exclusions, the Court has also stated that “mental processes” are not
eligible for patent protection. 14 Furthermore, in a recent interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s opinions, the Federal Circuit stated that “the patent
statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for their
operation on human intelligence alone.”15
¶4
Several lower court opinions have alluded to additional
categorical exclusions from statutory subject matter, specifically, the
“mathematical algorithm exception” and “business method exception.”16

6

See, e.g., § 102 (requiring that the invention be novel); § 103 (protecting only
non-obvious subject matter).
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See § 101.
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Id.
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See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that “Congress
intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is made
by man”).
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See § 101.
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Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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Id.
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In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
16
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
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“business method” exceptions).
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Those two “exceptions” deserve separate treatment, but one point that
the Federal Circuit made very clear in In re Bilski was the rejection of
any categorical exclusions beyond those already recognized by the
Supreme Court. 17 The “mathematical algorithm exception,” however, is
not really a categorical exclusion. Rather, it is shorthand for the
proposition that mathematical relationships, in the abstract, are
fundamental principles, and thus, not patentable subject matter 18 By
contrast, the “business method exception” was purported to be a true
categorical exclusion from statutory subject matter and has been
expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit. 19
In theory, statutory subject matter includes “anything under the
sun that is made by man,” 20 and the only categorical exclusions to
statutory subject matter are the three species of fundamental principles.21
Therefore, the tests of statutory subject matter that the Federal Circuit
has handed down over the years, 22 presumably, have been mere attempts
to articulate a coherent rule with which to differentiate applications that
claim only fundamental principles from those whose claims are drawn to
anything else, so long as it is man-made. In Bilski, the Federal Circuit
fashioned its latest articulation for parsing statutory subject matter, and
that test—the “machine-or-transformation” test 23—may be indicative of
a significant shift in the statutory-subject-matter doctrine. Any shift that
has occurred as a result of the new test, although affecting all process
claims, will be especially pronounced in the area of “knowledge
¶5

17

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (explaining that, while
an application of a mathematical formula may be eligible for patent protection,
the same formula in isolation would not be); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373
(connecting the “mathematical algorithm” exception to the Court’s analysis of
mathematical formulae in Diehr).
19
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960.
20
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
21
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Of course, “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas,” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, are not really made by
man; they are discovered.
22
First, there was the “Freeman-Walter-Abele” test, which was designed to
“identify unpatentable [disembodied] mathematical algorithms.” State Street,
149 F.3d at 1374. Then came the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry,
which had a similar purpose to the former test. Id. at 1373. The “machine-ortransformation” test, set forth in Bilski, has replaced both of those earlier tests.
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60.
23
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
18
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products.” 24 Software, business methods, and diagnostic tests are three
prime examples of knowledge products.
As Judge Newman pointed out, since the Federal Circuit issued
its opinion in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., there have been a huge number of patent applications under
Class 705, which is the class containing business method patents.25 Also,
that decision marked the beginning of a sharp increase in number of
Class-705 applications filed per year. 26 And even though the rate of
allowance dropped off over the past six years, 27 State Street also marked
the beginning of a dramatic increase in the total number of patents issued
under that class per year. 28 Thus, to the extent that those patents were
issued on the basis of the now-abrogated authority of State Street, Bilski
has introduced a great amount of uncertainty to the validity of many
business method patents. Because of the practical similarities between
business methods, and software and diagnostic tests, Bilski has also
injected a substantial amount of uncertainty into those areas.
¶6

In Bilski, the application purported to claim a process 29 —
specifically, a business method—for hedging risk in commodities
transactions by having a middleman buy a commodity from a producer at
a fixed price and then selling the commodity to a consumer at a fixed
price. 30 Hence, the arrangement functions to insulate all of the parties
from the risk of adverse market fluctuations. 31 Significantly, however,
the claims were not limited to commodities, and could involve options
¶7

24

In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at *41 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 13, 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) (Newman, J., dissenting). While Judge
Newman may have limited her definition of “knowledge products” to business
methods, her analysis is easily extended to the areas of software and diagnostic
tests.
25
Id. at *42. Class 705 is titled “Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice,
Management, or Cost/Price Determination.” U.S. PTO classification information
is available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification.
26
See Wynn W. Coggins, Group Director, USPTO, Update on Business
Methods for the Business Methods Partnership Meeting 6 (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/partnership.pps.
27
See id.
28
U.S. PTO statistical information available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/index.html.
29
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “it is
undisputed that Applicants’ claims are not directed to a machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter). Thus, the only remaining possibility was that the
claims were intended to be drawn to a process. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
30
Id. at 949–50.
31
Id.
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too. 32 Similarly, the claims were not limited to implementation by any
particular machine or apparatus.33
¶8
Under Bilski’s “machine-or-transformation” test, “an applicant
may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his
claim is tied to a particular machine,”34 or by showing that “it transforms
an article into a different state or thing.” 35 Referencing Gottschalk v.
Benson, 36 the Federal Circuit expressed that “meaningful limits” must
attach to the claims regardless of which route—machine or
transformation—an applicant pursues. 37 Furthermore, “the involvement
of the machine or transformation in the claimed process” must be more
than “insignificant extra-solution activity.” 38 Such “extra-solution
activity” is mere clever draftsmanship by which an applicant might
attempt to render an unpatentable fundamental principle patentable by
“recit[ing] a specific machine or a particular transformation of a specific
article.” 39 Because the claims in Bilski were not drawn to any machine,
the Federal Circuit did not elaborate further on the machine prong of the
test. 40 In later cases, however, the Federal Circuit has given guidance on
the definition of “machine” within the meaning of its new test.

In re Ferguson involved claims ostensibly drawn to processes; 41
thus, Bilski was directly on point. In short, the application claimed a
network of relationships among businesses, in which one of the
businesses—a marketing team—would market the products of multiple,
independent manufacturers in return for a share of the profits from each
manufacturer and an exclusive marketing agreement as to those
products. 42 Applying the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the process claims were “not tied to any particular
machine or apparatus.” 43 The court further explained that “a machine is a
‘concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination
of devices . . . [that] includes every mechanical device or combination of
¶9

32

Id. at 950.
Id. at 962.
34
Id. at 961.
35
Id. at 962.
36
409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (concluding that, because the mathematical
algorithm involved in the case had “no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer,” the patent, if upheld, would effectively
preempt the algorithm itself, despite a claim tying the algorithm to a computer).
37
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
38
Id. at 962 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
39
See id. at 957.
40
Id. at 961–62
41
No. 2007-1232, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4526, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2009).
42
Id. at *2–3.
43
Id. at *8.
33
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mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a
certain effect or result.’” 44 Specifically, the court stated that a “marketing
force” was not a machine within the meaning of the test. 45
¶10
Thankfully, Bilski itself provided significant insight into the
contours of the transformation analysis. The Federal Circuit tells us that,
in order for a process to meet the requirements of § 101 by way of the
transformation prong, the transformation “must be central to the purpose
of the claimed process.” 46 While only time can tell what this statement
really means, it appears to be a reiteration of the warning against evasive
drafting techniques. 47 With refreshing bluntness, the Bilski opinion states
that physical or chemical transformations of physical objects are always
going to pass muster under § 101. 48 As the court recognizes, however,
many modern functions that we generally think of as processes do not
involve manipulation of physical objects. 49 Although a great deal of
uncertainty remains in the precise application of the rule, Bilski is
expressly not intended to “expand the boundaries of what constitutes
patent-eligible transformations.”50
¶11
It seems that, in order for a process to satisfy § 101 via the
transformation prong (outside the context of physical or chemical
manipulation of a physical object), the process must be sufficiently tied
to a physical entity in some way. Transformation of electronic data to a
visual depiction will work, but presumably only if the raw electronic data
is representative of some actual physical entity. 51 The mere addition of a
data-gathering step to an otherwise unpatentable fundamental principle,
however, will not make the claims patentable. 52 In any case, the

44

Id. at *9 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
Id.
46
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
47
See id. at 957 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
48
See id. at 962; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69–70 (listing examples of
chemical and physical processes that would pass muster).
49
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (offering electronics and business methods as
examples).
50
Id. (emphasis added).
51
See id. at 963 (“Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public
or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”).
If electron data is representative of a physical entity and is transformed, there is
no need for the process to transform the physical entity itself. Id.
52
Id.
45
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organization of relationships among individuals or legal entities will not
satisfy the transformation prong of the test. 53
¶12
While the purpose of the machine-or-transformation test is
clear—“the prevention of pre-emption of fundamental principles” 54—the
current doctrine leaves many important questions unanswered. The
discussion that follows is an analysis of Bilski’s effects on three types of
“knowledge products,” based on subsequent applications of the new test
as well as an educated guess as to some areas that have not been fleshed
out by the courts.

I. SOFTWARE
A. Before Bilski
¶13
In addition to sparking an increase in business method patents,
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 55 was
the catalyst for a large increase in software patents.56 For over ten years,
the Federal Circuit’s permissive language from State Street had
encouraged applications for both classes of patents. Although the
independent claim in that case was drawn to a machine 57 as opposed to a
process, the principles and test expressed in the case were applicable to
both machines and processes. 58

In State Street, the patent claimed a machine for managing
mutual funds. 59 Specifically, the machine could pool mutual fund
resources into a partnership, and thus impart both tax benefits and the
advantage of “economies of scale.”60 The parties had been negotiating a
license for use of the patented machine, but the litigation ensued after
negotiations broke down. 61 The party that had been negotiating for the
license then sought a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid as
non-statutory subject matter. 62
¶14

53

Id.
Id.
55
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
56
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for
Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 267–68 (2000)
(stating that State Street made business methods patentable, and discussing the
bustle of activity in the area).
57
See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
58
See id. at 1372.
59
Id. at 1370.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
54
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¶15
According to the Federal Circuit, a computer was “a virtual
necessity” to the operation of the machine because of the complexity and
requisite alacrity of the calculations of each mutual fund’s share in the
partnership. 63 Although it is still uncertain to what extent a hopeful
applicant’s process claims must require a machine for operation, the
court’s analysis of the related issue in State Street is worth noting. The
court discussed its prior opinions in In re Alappat 64 and Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 65 but the discussions
point in two different directions when viewed from a post-Bilski
standpoint. The court stated that the patent in Alappat passed statutorysubject-matter scrutiny because the mathematical algorithm was used to
produce “a useful, concrete and tangible result.” 66 The court was
specifically referring to the result of a smooth wave form on a monitor. 67
While that analysis sounds very permissive and, if applied consistently,
would provide most software with a route to patentability, the court’s
other example—Arrhythmia—is much more restrictive.

In Arrhythmia, “the transformation of electrocardiograph signals
from a patient’s heartbeat by a machine through a series of mathematical
calculations” was held to be statutory subject matter because it
corresponded to the patient’s heartbeat.68 Thus, Alappat, as discussed in
State Street, is much broader than Arrhythmia because the analysis from
Arrhythmia was based on the signal correlating to a physical entity—the
patient’s heartbeat. By contrast, Alappat merely required a
transformation from raw data points to a curve, without the requirement
that the curve represent a physical entity.
¶16

The “useful, concrete and tangible result” test was the most
significant fallout from State Street, 69 but presumably, many of the
software patents granted under that case’s authority were based on the
broad, permissive analysis of Alappat. In Bilski, however, the Federal
Circuit adopted an approach much more akin to the more restrictive
reasoning from Arrhythmia.
¶17

B. After Bilski
¶18
One glimmer of certainty from Bilski for software patent
proponents was the fact that, despite recommendations by several amici
to do so, the Federal Circuit refused to rule that software could never be
63

Id. at 1371.
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
65
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See id.
64
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patented. 70 The general tenor of the opinion, however, did not bode well
for software patent holders and appears to have adopted a more
restrictive approach to that area.
¶19
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit told us that the physicality of the
steps performed on a computer by software is irrelevant; 71 the inquiry is
whether the process is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
whether it transforms any article into a different state or thing. 72 For
example, the court stated that transformation of electronic data to a visual
depiction would satisfy statutory-subject-matter requirements, but only if
the source data is representative of a physical entity. 73 The court was also
clear that if the process could be performed entirely in the human mind,
it would not be statutory subject matter.74
¶20
However, many questions remain in the area of software patents,
most notably, the question of whether a general computer is a “particular
machine” within the meaning of the test. 75 Assuming that a computer
could function as a particular machine for purposes of the test, to what
extent must a general computer be necessary to perform the process? For
example, if each individual step in an algorithm could conceivably be
performed within the human mind over a period of many years, but the
combination of a piece of software and a computer could perform the
process in a matter of seconds, would the software be tied to a particular
machine? In short, what is meant by the phrase, “tied to a particular
machine?” 76
¶21
The majority in Ferguson did not directly address whether a
computer could be a machine within the meaning of the test. However,
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board), whose
opinion the majority affirmed, rejected the process claims on §101
grounds, concluding that they “do not expressly or implicitly require
performance of any of the steps by a machine, such as a general purpose
digital computer.” 77 Thus, the Board appears to view a computer as a
“particular machine,” 78 at least in certain contexts. Moreover, in her
concurrence, Judge Newman acknowledges that the Federal Circuit has
70

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 n.23 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See id. at 961.
72
Id.
73
See id. at 963.
74
Id. at 961 n.26.
75
The Federal Circuit specifically stated that it was leaving that critical question
for another day. Id. at 962.
76
Id. at 961.
77
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Ex parte
Ferguson, No. 2003-1044, slip op. at 13 (B.P.A.I. 2004)) (emphasis added).
78
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
71
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left it as an open question, but suggests that a computer must be a
“Bilski-acceptable machine[]” in some circumstances. 79
¶22
Close analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gottschalk v.
Benson 80 yields additional insight into the possible effects of Bilski on
the patentability of software. In Benson, the applicants sought a patent
for a “method of programming a general-purpose digital computer” to
convert signals from one format to another. 81 Significantly, the
operations could be performed mentally. 82 The Court concluded,
therefore, that a computer was unnecessary to the process. 83 That
conclusion alone might have supported the Court’s ultimate decision to
reject the claims as not sufficiently tied to a machine. 84 However, the
Court also stated that, because the only practical applications of the
program would be in the context of a computer, granting a patent on the
program (though limited to use on a computer) would preempt all uses of
the mathematical operations themselves. 85 Thus, while the case law
assumes that a computer could serve as an adequate machine for
purposes of subject-matter scrutiny of a process claim, the cases also
create a somewhat confusing paradox: The computer must not be mere
post-solution activity, that is, it must be necessary to some extent; but
when the process applies a fundamental principle, the computer must not
be so necessary to the process as to entirely preempt the underlying
fundamental principle.
¶23
Importantly, Benson is still good law. But while that opinion
stopped short of adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the
exclusive test for statutory subject matter in processes, 86 the Bilski
opinion shut the door on possible exceptions. 87 Thus, the Federal Circuit
seems to have adopted an even stricter approach than that of the Supreme
79

Ferguson, 558 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., concurring) (stating that, in Bilski,
“the court recognized that the State Street Bank test was directed to processes
performed by computer, thus meeting the Bilski test.”).
80
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
81
Id. at 65.
82
Id. at 67.
83
Id.
84
If the conclusion that a computer was not necessary to the procedure had been
coupled with an unequivocal statement from the Court that the program failed to
be tied to a machine because a computer was not strictly necessary to its use,
that would tend to suggest that it does not matter how impractical performance
of a mathematical operation might be without the aid of a computer, so long as it
was strictly possible. This secondary conclusion could threaten the validity of an
even broader scope of software patents.
85
See id. at 71–72.
86
See id. at 71.
87
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955–56 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Court. Based on the language from Bilski, Ferguson, and Benson, it
appears that many software patents may be in jeopardy either because
they are not tied to a particular machine 88 or because they have no
relationship with any physical entity. 89

II. BUSINESS METHODS
A. Before Bilski
More than any other class, business method patents have been
heavily criticized. Justice Kennedy has expressed concern over “[t]he
potential vagueness and suspect validity of some . . . [business method]
patents.” 90 Broadly patenting business methods has arguably led to
patents over very mundane practices.91 Additionally, such patents have
been criticized as doing nothing more than incorporating widely known
practices into cyberspace. 92 There are also those who view business
method patents as much more innocuous. For example, in her concurring
opinion in Ferguson, Judge Newman criticizes the majority’s “retreat
into the methods of the past.” 93 Following the logic of her opinion, the
regime from which the majority must be retreating is State Street. And it
is that opinion that fostered the issuance of so many business method
patents. Thus, she must at least believe that most of those patents are
worthy of the protection they have been given. However, State Street
aside, the last one hundred years of patent jurisprudence has been highly
unfavorable to methods of doing business.
¶24

88

This point is capable of multiple readings. A computer could be deemed to
never suffice as a particular machine. Even if a computer could serve as a
particular machine, it might be the case that only software whose operations
absolutely required a computer for their performance would be deemed as
sufficiently tied to the computer.
A related idea is that, while a computer could serve as a particular machine, if
the software claimed mathematical algorithms and had no practical application
outside of a computer, it might be construed to completely preempt the
mathematical algorithm. Such an approach would render the software ineligible
for patent protection. Logically, this concept must be limited to the context of
process claims that involve application of fundamental principles (e.g.,
mathematical algorithms). It is still relevant to the current discussion, because
this concept presupposes that computers may suffice as a machine in other
scenarios.
89
See id.
90
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
91
See Dreyfuss, supra note 56, at 268.
92
Id. at 279.
93
See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
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Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. 94 is the case that is
credited with the “business method exception” to statutory subject
matter. 95 In that case, the patent claimed a system related to cash
registers intended to prevent fraud and theft by employees of restaurants
and hotels. 96 The basic idea was that each employee was assigned a
number and that number was used to identify all transactions performed
by the employee on behalf of the business. 97 The court held that “[a]
system of transacting business disconnected from the means of carrying
out the system is not . . . an art.” 98 Thus, the business method exception
was born; and Lorraine and its line were responsible for severely
limiting the success of business method patents for ninety years. 99
¶25

¶26
In 1998, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in State Street marked the
end of the quasi-prohibition against business method patents, 100 and in
similar fashion, its effect on software patents, leading almost
immediately to a significant increase in business method patent
activity. 101 In State Street, the Federal Circuit rejected the notion that
business methods, as a class, were not eligible subject matter for patent
protection. 102 The court held that patent applications drawn to business
methods were eligible so long as they met all the requirements of one of
the categories of subject matter.103
¶27
The machine claimed in State Street for managing mutual funds
was limited by the incorporation of a computer.104 The court applied its
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test and held that “the
transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a

94

160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
See William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business
Models After State Street Bank, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 30 (2000).
To clarify, Wiese merely cites Lorraine as the case others look to as the
progenitor of the business method exception and actually concludes that the
exception never, in fact, existed.
96
Lorraine, 160 F. at 467.
97
See id. at 467–69.
98
Id. at 469. At the time, Congress had not yet replaced the term “art” with
“process.” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
99
See Wiese, supra note 95, at 30.
100
Id.
101
See Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method
Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional
History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 66 (2002).
102
See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 139 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Some have concluded that the “business method
exception” never existed. See Wiese, supra note 95, at 18.
103
State Street, 139 F.3d at 1375.
104
Id. at 1371.
95
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machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price” is statutory subject matter within the meaning of the statute.105 The
court went on to explain that the process employed a mathematical
algorithm toward a practical application by producing the requisite
“useful, concrete and tangible result.” 106 Specifically, the “result” was
the accurate share price for each mutual fund based on the percentage
stake in the partnership by the particular fund.107

B. After Bilski
¶28
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit affirmed its prior rejection of a
categorical exclusion of business methods from patentable subject
matter. 108 However, unlike the broadly inclusive language of State Street,
the new opinion and its new test are very restrictive. While the court
rejected the “Freeman-Walter-Abele” test, which required that a
mathematical algorithm be connected to physical elements or process
steps, 109 the “machine-or-transformation” test, nonetheless, seems to
require an algorithm to be grounded in some physical element, at least in
most cases. In discussing those cases of its predecessor court, the Federal
Circuit alluded to the fact that it had held unpatentable a process for
rendering a graphical representation of data, 110 yet held patent-eligible
another patent because it was drawn to a process to electronically display
images of a patient’s bones and internal organs.111 The critical difference
for the court was the process’s connection to physical elements.112

In Ferguson, the Federal Circuit made significant progress in
explaining Bilski, especially in the context of business methods. Besides
explaining, generally, the correct interpretations of both prongs of the
new test,113 the court also gave some insight as to the viability of State
Street. The court said that Bilski did not overturn State Street, but that it
did supersede the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test with the
“machine-or-transformation” test for all §101 determinations. 114 In
¶29
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Id. at 1373.
Id.
107
Id. In its discussion of “so-called business methods” within Bilski, the
Federal Circuit questioned whether processes dealing in “abstract constructs
such as legal obligations, organizational relationships, and business risks” might
qualify as statutory subject matter through the transformation prong of the
transformation-or-machine test. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
108
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960.
109
Id. at 959.
110
Id. at 962.
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Id. at 962–63.
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See id. at 963.
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See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363–65 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
114
See id. at 1364 n.3.
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response to the applicant’s argument that his process claims should be
approved under State Street as business methods, the court was only
willing to distinguish State Street on its facts by stating that the claims in
that case were drawn to a machine. 115 It seems that the court intended to
mummify State Street in order to allow it to replace the test without
having to conclude that business methods are per se non-statutory subject
matter. 116
¶30
Thus, business methods will be facing many of the same
challenges that software patents now face. After all, many business
methods are inextricably intertwined with computers and software.
Similar to the area of software patents, where the most pressing question
after Bilski is whether, and in what context, a personal computer can
serve as a machine, one of the questions in the realm of business method
patents is what devices could serve as a machine. As a practical matter, if
a personal computer cannot be the machine, then what other devices can
business methods be linked to? Moreover, when will a business method
transform an article to a different state or thing? The examples from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Benson—“tanning, dyeing, making
waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” 117 —are not
likely intended to encourage business method patent applications.

III. DIAGNOSTIC ASSAYS
A. Before Bilski
In Bislki, the Federal Circuit discussed several precedents that
dealt with diagnostic tests. 118 Specifically, it discussed In re Meyer, 119 In
re Grams, 120 and Justice Breyer’s dissent from dismissal of certiorari in
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc. 121
¶31

¶32
The Meyer case involved a diagnostic process to determine the
source of a malfunction in a complex system. 122 Although the process
was not expressly limited to the field of neurology, neurology was one
field in which the applicant claimed the process would have a useful

115

See id. at 1365.
Further evidence of this conclusion is given in the language: “in Bilski this
court refused to extend or even to take a broad reading of the holding in State
Street.” Id.
117
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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See id. at 965.
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688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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application. 123 The court held the process ineligible for patent protection
because it was preemptive of a fundamental principle—specifically, a
mathematical algorithm. 124 Even as drafted, the claims probably would
have passed scrutiny after State Street opened the floodgates for
previously questionable patents, but especially if the claims had been
limited to use on a computer. 125
¶33
In Grams, the applicant’s claims described a process to diagnose
a patient by analyzing the levels of various constituents in his body fluids
which were measured via laboratory testing. 126 As in Meyer, the court
held that the claims were not drawn to statutory subject matter because
they would preempt a mathematical algorithm. 127 If those same claims
had been made with the addition of a claim to incorporate a computer to
produce the result of the process, the claims would certainly have passed
under State Street’s permissive rule. But, even as stated, the patent would
probably have passed muster under State Street.
¶34
Justice Breyer, with two other justices, discussed the issue of
diagnostic assay patentability in a dissenting opinion from a dismissal of
certiorari in Laboratory Corp. 128 The facts of that case involved a patent
application for a process to diagnose vitamin deficiencies by measuring
the concentration of a particular amino acid in the patient’s blood.129 The
lower courts had held that the patent was valid and enforced a judgment
for infringement. 130 The Court granted certiorari, but then dismissed the
case, concluding that certiorari had been improvidently granted.131
¶35
While the message to be gleaned from the Court dismissing the
case is unclear, it seems that a reasonable conclusion would be that a
majority of the Court would have upheld the patent. The three dissenters,
however, expressed strong disapproval both of the dismissal of certiorari
and of the validity of the diagnostic assay patent.
¶36
Citing Diehr, Flook, and many other cases, the dissent argued
that the claims were not drawn to statutory subject matter because they
were merely attempting to patent a biological relationship between the
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See Grams, 888 F.2d at 836–37.
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concentration of the amino acid and the concentration of the two
vitamins. 132 The application included claims drawn to novel methods for
measuring the amino acid concentration—gas chromatography and mass
spectrometry—but the lower courts construed the claims as not limited to
those methods. 133 The dissent briefly discusses State Street, seemingly
admitting that State Street’s “useful, concrete and tangible result” test
would have supported the patent. 134 But the dissent also expressly
disavowed ever adopting the test from State Street 135 and concluded that
the claimed subject matter at issue in Laboratory Corp. was an
“unpatentable ‘natural phenomenon.’” 136
There is significant doubt as to the take-away implications of the
dismissal of the writ of certiorari, especially because the lower courts had
not directly considered the statutory-subject-matter issue. 137 However,
Breyer’s dissent gives us some important insight into the view of three
justices. Furthermore, if we assume that the majority of the Court would
have upheld the patent, it would tend to establish the Court’s
endorsement of the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street. However, if
we believe that the dismissal of certiorari was based on the technicality
of not having the lower court directly address the § 101 issue, then the
dismissal’s meaning is much less certain. That uncertainty
notwithstanding, it is fairly clear that at least the dissent believed that the
claims would satisfy the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test but
would not meet its own test of statutory subject matter.
¶37

B. After Bilski
¶38
Bilski is dispositive with respect to the § 101 analysis of all
process patents, but it has unevenly restricted the patentability of
diagnostic assays along with other “knowledge products.” Under this
more restrictive regime, when a diagnostic test is not tied to a particular
measurement and is not limited to any particular machine or system, it
may well be rejected as an attempt to preempt a fundamental principle.138

Upon inspection under the machine-or-transformation approach,
it seems fairly obvious that neither the patent in Meyer nor the patent in
Grams would survive scrutiny. Neither of the respective processes was
transforming anything physically or chemically, nor was there any
¶39
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physical limitation claimed in the applications. 139 Moreover, they were
not limited to use in conjunction with a particular machine, not even a
computer. 140
¶40
It is also highly doubtful whether the claims in Laboratory Corp.
would now pass the Federal Circuit’s statutory-subject-matter scrutiny.
The claim in dispute was not limited to any of the specialized laboratory
methods or equipment 141 and thus would probably not be sufficiently tied
to a machine. Further, it is difficult to imagine what transformation the
process could be accomplishing by measuring the level of an amino acid
in a blood sample. 142

As mere illustrations of the probable effects of Bilski on § 101
analysis of diagnostic tests, those examples indicate that the patentability
of this particular realm of subject matter has been substantially restricted.
By adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test for
determining whether a process is patentable subject matter, the Federal
Circuit has likely taken an even more restrictive approach to statutory
subject matter than the Supreme Court.
¶41

CONCLUSION
¶42
By adopting the machine-or-transformation test for all processpatent claims, the Federal Circuit has significantly reduced the scope of §
101’s coverage, but it has made it especially difficult for those applicants
seeking patents over knowledge products. That court has clearly stated
its purpose, which is to prevent the preemption of fundamental
principles, 143 but it remains to be seen whether the test it has adopted will
be too narrow. One’s idea of a “good” test for determining statutory
subject matter depends greatly upon whether one thinks patenting
software, business methods, and diagnostic tests is generally a good idea.
And regardless of whether the results of a particular test are interpreted
as positive or negative for society as a whole, there will certainly be an
impact from such a significant change.
¶43
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit alluded to the possibility that the
Supreme Court may decide to alter the new test because of difficulties
stemming from advances in technology. 144 Having granted certiorari in
Bilski, 145 the Supreme Court has accepted the Federal Circuit’s invitation
139

See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 790–93 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Grams, 888
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141
See Laboratory Corp., 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142
See id.
143
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
144
Id. at 956.
145
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 005

to speak on the issue. As we await the Court’s decision, it is important to
consider that the Court has never expressly adopted the test formulated in
Bilski and has, at least on one occasion, expressly stated that an
application’s failure to meet the test would not inevitably render the
claims unpatentable. 146 However the Court decides the case, hopefully
the opinion will bring needed certainty to this important area of law.
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See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).

